A Pragmatic Concept of the Self

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A Pragmatic Concept of the Self.

Chloe West - Unpublished

0. Introduction

Every belief requires the possession of particular concepts. For example, the belief that the sky is blue requires concepts of “sky” and “blue”. Concepts vary across and within individuals. Furthermore, individuals can possess many overlapping concepts depending on how they classify objects in the world. As concepts change, beliefs update as a consequence of this change. Because of this, evidentialists might argue that our concepts should be formed in an epistemically responsible way, and lead to the formation of evidentially supported beliefs. Philosophical work on concepts has not been properly incorporated in to the evidentialism / pragmatism [1] debate; this could be so, because unlike beliefs, concepts are not easily evaluable for truth or falsity. For the purposes of my argument, my aim is to posit that certain pragmatic concepts, such as the concept of one’s self, do not necessarily impede on evidentialist requirements of belief formation. In what follows, I will argue that adopting a pragmatic concept of the self does not endorse pragmatism about beliefs, but rather a beneficial rearrangement of how people categorize themselves and their relationship to the world and others.

I begin in section 1 by introducing pragmatic concepts and the potential relationship between pragmatic concepts and belief. In section 2 I present my argument for a pragmatic concept of the self. I posit 3 conditions that I argue are necessary for adopting a pragmatic concept. In Section 3 I introduce the no-self concept, and discuss why is it compelling pragmatic concept of the self. In 3.1 explore how one achieves the no-self concept, and in 3.2 I discuss the cognitive experiences of those who achieve a no-self concept. Finally, in section 4, I address some potential limitations and global remarks.

1. Pragmatic Concepts

A pragmatic concept, C, can be understood as a concept that is formed on the basis of pragmatic considerations, despite a lack of evidence supporting the truthfulness of C. In contrast an epistemic concept might be a concept that is formed only one the basis of evidence. Weber (2017) posits a few notions regarding concept formation and belief that, for the purposes of this paper, I will assume evidentialists would be in favor of. These are: 1. That the process by which some concept C is formed/updated determines whether an individual has warrant to form empirical beliefs about the subject matter indicated by C. And 2. C should make a positive epistemic contribution to the formation and preservation of empirical beliefs (Weber, 2017). Therefore, is reasonable to assume that concepts formed in an epistemically irresponsible way should not lead to the formation of beliefs. The rational for this might be that: beliefs that contain epistemically irresponsible constituents, would themselves be epistemically irresponsible. To illustrate (1) imagine you and your friend are walking through the forest late at night, and your friend says she feels a ghost’s presence nearby.  In this situation you employ your concept of ghost in order to engage in this conversation; but is clear that your concept of ghost, because there is no strong evidence supporting the existence of ghosts, was not formed on the basis of evidence. Thus, (2) it would be epistemically irresponsible to form the belief that you you just encountered a ghost. However, you forming and possessing the concept of ghost is not the problem, it is instead the formation of beliefs based on this concept. The same thinking can be applied to concepts of God, demons, and other “imaginary” concepts that are commonly employed in belief formation by others.

An evidentialist would probably argue that pragmatic concept formation, does not warrant the formation of beliefs. For an evidentialist, a well-acquired concept, epistemically speaking, would be one that is formed in an “evidence-based manner”. Two potential conditions of concept formation that might be endorsed by an evidentialist are the evidential condition[2] and the Concept Acquisition Reliability Condition[3]. However, I will illustrate that we should make allowances for pragmatic considerations in the formation of certain concepts, specifically the concept of the “self”. In what follows, I will show that a pragmatic concept of the self does not necessarily impede on evidentialist requirements of belief formation.

 In order to illustrate my argument, I must first posit the following conditions for a pragmatic concept to be considered one that ought to be adopted.

I. The concept C should directly lead to benefits.

II. C should not predictably lead to harm of one’s self, others, or the world.

III. C should not automatically encode epistemically irrational or irresponsible beliefs.

I argue that if a concept meets these three conditions, then, despite the way the concept is formed (i.e., evidentially irresponsible concept formation) the concept ought to be adopted.

The pragmatic concept of the self I will be discussing is what I call the “no-self concept”. In what follows I will show that the no-self concept adequately meets the conditions posited above.

3. The No-Self Concept

What is the no-self concept? For one who possesses the no-self concept, their concept of self extends beyond themselves as an individual entity. The no-self concept differs from a belief in that it is a representation of how one categorizes their self in the world. However, because concepts are constituents of belief, the no-self concept is closely associated with beliefs such as “the self is does not exist; the self is an illusion”. I will discuss this in more detail in section 3.2. Why should one adopt such a concept of the self? There is strong empirical evidence that the no-self concept directly leads to pragmatic benefits, and arguably epistemic benefits as well (Diebels & Leary, 2019; Letheby, 2016). Before discussing this further, I must first illustrate how such a concept of the self might come about.

3.1 Adopting The No Self Concept

There are three methods that have been shown to produce the no-self concept, these are: psychedelic[4] experiences, near-death experiences, and Buddhist meditation (Letheby & Gerrans, 2017; Martial et al., 2021; Nour et al., 2016; Shiah, 2016). All of these routes to the no-self concept involve a temporary loosening of one’s subjective sense of self and connectedness or unity with the universe and others. What is known as ego dissolution occurs when the ordinary sense of self is replaced by a sense of union with an ultimate reality underlying all of manifest existence (Letheby & Gerrans, 2017). Importantly, there is scientific evidence that has validated that such subjective experiences of ego dissolution do occur during psychedelic experiences (Nour et al., 2016). Furthermore, it has been shown that the ego dissolution experience does lead to the adoption of the no-self concept (Timmermann et al., 2021). It is important that I point out that for the purposes of this paper I will not be discussing in detail the philosophy of how concept formation or updating occurs. It should be noted that I am operating under the assumption that in order for one to adopt the no-self concept, a subjective ego dissolution experience is necessary.

            What is interesting about the ego dissolution experience is that it illustrates the flexibility of the self-concept. In psychedelic experiences at least, this altered state of consciousness forces the experiencer into a cognitive state in which they can completely lack a concept of the self. (Barrett et al., 2016; Carbonaro et al., 2016). Fortunately, this lack of a self concept is temporary but the concept of one’s self is altered long-term and continues well after the experience (Nour et al., 2016; Timmermann et al., 2021). Importantly, the cognitive experience of one who adopts a no-self concept is much different, and as I will illustrate, more beneficial than a rigid self-concept.

3.2 Pragmatic Benefits of the No-Self Concept

In this next section I will illustrate how adopting the no-self concept fulfills the 3 conditions I have proposed above. Condition 1 is that the concept C should directly lead to benefits. There is empirical evidence that strongly implies that the no-self concept does indeed directly lead to benefits. Such benefits effect one’s cognitive experiences, values, relationships, and behavior; this include mental health benefits, empathy for others, care for the natural world, openness to experience, and more (Diebels & Leary, 2019). Those who adopt the no-self concept possess cognitive experiences distinct from their experience before the acquisition of this concept (Shiah, 2016). To illustrate the benefits of the no-self concept I must first discuss the negative components of a rigid self concept. A rigid self-state, also known as egoism, is recognized by western psychologists as one the basic motivations of the human mind: It is desire for pleasure and aversion to pain (Leifer, 1999). A consequence of this motivation is often to strengthen the self by pursuing desires, this leads to fluctuating happiness that relies on short-lived external stimuli (Leifer, 1999; Shiah, 2016). To illustrate how a no-self versus rigid self concept deals with pleasure and pain let us look at how each concept deals with threats to the life of the individual.

The desire to avoid death is an inevitable threat and a challenge to the self or the identity of a human being. According to the Terror Management Theory, one of the most significant theories on how the self deals with death, the avoidance of death anxiety is arguably one of the strongest human motives; and because the threat of death never disappears and comes up in a variety forms, all the time, it can motivate many human activities (Greenberg et al., 1990). Briefly, the TMT suggests that death anxiety drives one to strengthen their sense of self in order to increase self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1990). Self-esteem is a sense of personal worth that is derived from the belief in the validity of the worldview of one's culture and from living up to the standards that are part of that worldview (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). Feeling significant means seeing oneself as a valuable contributor to a meaningful universe and that one's life has both meaning and value. However, because death is inevitable, one needs endless action to maintain and strengthen the self so it can cope with death anxiety or unhappiness.

            Those who genuinely possess the no-self concept, because they think differently about themselves, do not fall victim to this cycle of pleasure and pain in dealing with death anxiety. Research has shown that the no-self concept involves feelings of humility (Stellar et al., 2018)and reduced self-focused attention (SFA) (Shiota et al., 2007). Humility has been shown to reduce death anxiety and buffer against the effects of induced mortality awareness (Kesebir et al., 2011). It is thus plausible that acquiring a no-self concept may reduce death anxiety through a generalized reduced sense of the importance of the self and its concerns, including its inevitable demise. The reduced self-focused attention that those who possess the no self concept experience may also underly the antidepressant effects of psychedelic experiences. Self-focused attention (SFA), which refers to excessive and rigid self-focus, is considered closely related to depression (Brockmeyer et al., 2015)). In his influential model of chronic depression, McCullough (2003)argued that chronically depressed patients, particularly those with an early onset of the disorder, feature a particularly pronounced self-focus. When ego dissolution occurs, focus is shifted ‘outward’ on the perceptual environment, or on problem solving with an impersonal aspect (Nour et al., 2016). So, it is plausible that the adoption of the no-self concept allows people to continue focusing outward, instead of on the self, because their representation of self extends beyond their own perceptual experience. Future research is needed to clearly establish a directly relationship between possession of the no-self concept and depression. However, I argue that low SFA is a significant cognitive feature that distinguishes one who possesses a no-self concept from one who does not. Outside of depression and death anxiety, is seems that possessing of the no-self concept and consequentially, low SFA has overall positive effects on a person’s well-being, and openness to experience (Diebels & Leary, 2019). Together this demonstrates that that possessing the no-self concept is beneficial, fulfilling condition 1.

Condition 2 I propose is that C should not predictively lead to harm of one’s self, others, or the world. Before I begin addressing condition 2 it is important to note that I will be citing an article that discusses the psychological benefits of believing in the oneness of everything (Diebels & Leary, 2019). However, the authors themselves state that “the belief in oneness in conceptually distinct from other aspects of spirituality, and people may believe in oneness without otherwise being ‘spiritual’ (Diebels & Leary, 2019). Furthermore, “believing in oneness” is highly correlated with the sentiment that “I am never separate from others”, thus the concept that the individual self does actually exist (Diebels & Leary, 2019). Therefore, I believe that what they call “believing in oneness” and what I refer to as the “no-self concept”, are equivalent.

One consequence of possessing the no-self concept is that the line between self and other is blurred; this is because when one’s concept of the self is that there is no individual self, the concept of anything outside of the self is directly affected by this (Diebels & Leary, 2019; Shiah, 2016). In other words, the no-self concept is associated with a meta-personal or allo-inclusive identity in which people conceptualize themselves within a larger context that includes others (Diebels & Leary, 2019). Empirical research has shown that shown that including others in one’s concept of self has been associated with empathy, perspective taking, and prosocial behavior (Diebels & Leary, 2019). Essentially by increasing the size of one’s in-group, one draws all of humanity into one’s circle of concern. Along the same line of thinking, this also applies to greater concern for animals and the world. All of this to say, not only does the no-self concept meet condition 2 but it exceeds this condition (Diebels & Leary, 2019).

Condition 3, that C should not automatically encode epistemically irrational or irresponsible beliefs, is where things become a bit more complicated. The no-self concept does have potential “epistemically risky” implications on belief. Employing the no-self concept can lead to the formation of non-naturalistic metaphysical beliefs (Letheby, 2016; Timmermann et al., 2021). This is because the no-self concept is closely tied with believing in a “cosmic consciousness”, specifically in cases where the no-self concept is adopted after experiencing ego dissolution during a psychedelic induced religious, spiritual, or mystical experience (RSME) (Davis et al., 2020; Griffiths et al., 2019). Furthermore, the no-self concept is closely tied to the belief that everything in the universe is a part of one entity. However, the likelihood of these beliefs forming remains unknown, and this is not a guaranteed result of adopting and employing a no-self concept (Diebels & Leary, 2019; Letheby, 2016). Therefore, the no self concept meets condition three in that is not automatically encode epistemically irrational or irresponsible belief; for that reason, even strict evidentialists should not disregard this pragmatic concept of the self.

What is it about the no-self concept that makes it that one can possess this pragmatic concept without it leading to the formation or epistemically irrational or irresponsible belief? Perhaps it is because of the distinct cognitive experience of one who possesses this concept. It is plausible to think that when one possesses the no self concept and thus has reduced SFA they spend less time worrying about their own desires and beliefs, especially beliefs like religious credence that rely on in-group versus out-group thinking. Furthermore, the no-self concept may lead to more accurate beliefs because Groupish beliefs often contain distorted identity narratives. In fact, research has shown that possessing the no self-concept is associated with alleviating desires (Shiah, 2016). And it is plausible to think that desires are a major driver of belief formation.

Or perhaps it has to do with the fact that while one’s concept of the no-self represents more than their self as an individual entity, they still subjectively experience life as an individual entity, separate from others and the external world. Thus, it would be quite difficult for one to convince themselves of a belief that has evidence opposing that belief constantly and consistently throughout life, with the exception of the temporary ego dissolution experience. In other words, concepts possessed in cases where high-rates of evidence against any beliefs formed on the bases of that concept are not as vulnerable to evidence-less belief formation as other types of concepts and beliefs. However, future research should be done in order to fully elucidate what features of a pragmatic belief allow it meet condition 3 that I have proposed.

4 Conclusion and Global Remarks

In my argument I laid out 3 conditions that, if met, provide adequate reason for one to possess a pragmatic concept. Next, I presented a pragmatic concept of the self which I call the no-self concept, that meets these necessary conditions. Given so, in my view even a strict evidentialist should find my argument compelling. One limitation of my argument is that it relies on empirical research investigating the belief in oneness of everything. Although my view is that what the authors of this paper call the belief in oneness is the same cognitive experience as the no-self concept, research should be done in order to support this claim and parse out these any differences in these ideas. My argument also relies on the assumption that other pragmatic concepts, outside of the one presented here, do lead to the formation of epistemically irrational or irresponsible beliefs. More work is needed in order to fully understand what features of concepts lead to belief formation and what features prevent irrational belief formation.

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[1] The evidentialist / pragmatism debate refers a debate in philosophy of belief that argues what constitutes a good reason to form a belief. Evidentialists argue that evidence alone is the only reason for when one ought to belief something. Pragmatists on the other hand argue that there are pragmatic considerations that should bear on beliefs we hold. I.e, if the belief in God provides benefits than it is a good belief to possess, despite a lack fo scientific evidence.

[2] Evidential Condition: The acquisition of a concept C based on experience e is warranted if e

is used as evidence for the property indicated by C. (Weber, 2017)

[3] Concept Acquisition Reliability Condition (CAR): The acquisition of a concept is warranted

if a concept is acquired from cognitive mechanisms using processes that reliably reflect the

appropriate environmental contingent relations between kind syndromes and natural kind

properties. (Weber, 2017)

[4] Here I am referring to 5HT2A receptor agonist ‘serotonergic’ psychedelics such as LSD, Psilocybin, and DMT.